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1 Introduction
An intermediate or superconstructive propositional logic is one obtained from Heyt-
ing’s formalisation of intuitionist propositional logic by the addition of zero or more
classical tautologies as new axioms and the familiar rules of inference – substitu-
tion and modus ponens – are retained. In the future I shall refer to these systems
merely as logics, and, further, will identify a logic with its set of theorems. They
have been an object of intensive study and the reader is referred to the book [2]
for an excellent summary of the most important concepts, definitions and results
obtain in this field. In particular, I shall assume that the reader is comfortable with
the interplay of these logics with the algebraic systems variously known as Heyting
algebras/pseudocomplemented lattices, which provide one – if perhaps not the most
natural – class of semantic models for the logics.
A logic L is said to have the disjunction property (DP) iff for all formulae A1
and A2:
`L A1 ∨A2 ⇔ `LA1 or `L A2.
A special case of the DP occurs when the disjuncts which occur are negated. In this
case I shall speak of the negative disjunction property (NDP). In other words the
NDP is the principle:
`L¬A1 ∨ ¬A2 ⇔ `L¬A1 or `L¬A2.
In the case of the DP, we can immediately see that certain generalizations can be
trivially established. Let us say that a logic L has the n-term disjunction property
iff for all formulae Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n):
`L
n∨
i=1
Ai ⇔ `L Ai for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Furthermore, a logic will be said to have the unlimited disjunction property (UDP)
if it has the n-term disjunction property for all n. Then if a logic has the DP, it
will also have the UDP by virtue of the fact that an n-term disjunction
∨n
i=1Ai can
always be written as A1 ∨
∨n
i=2Ai.
The same is no longer true for NDP. Thus the trick of rewriting ¬A1∨¬A2∨¬A3
as ¬A1 ∨¬(A2 ∧A3) implicitly presupposes that `L ¬(A2 ∧A3)→ (¬A2 ∨¬A3), for
arbitrary A2, A3, which is equivalent to having `L ¬A∨¬¬A (for arbitrary A). But
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clearly no L satisfying this last condition will enjoy the NDP. Accordingly if we say
that L has the n-term NDP when for all formulae Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ n):
`L
n∨
i−1
¬Ai ⇔ `L ¬Ai for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
and then define L to have the unrestricted negative disjunction property (UNDP)
when L has the n-term NDP for all n, the NDP (i.e., the 2-term NDP) does not
automatically secure the UNDP.
2 Results
In the [4], the Russian mathematician V. A. Jankov studied the logic – called
Jankov’s logic in what follows1 – obtained by adding the tautology(
(¬¬p ∧ (p→ q)) ∧ ((q → p)→ p))→ q
to the Heyting axioms and showed that this logic was characterized by the sequence
of Heyting algebras Ji (i ≥ 2) depicted in Figure 1, in the sense that A is a theorem
of Jankov’s logic iff v(A) = 1 for all Ji and for all valuations v on Ji. The Ji are
obtained by taking a Boolean algebra with i ≥ 2 atoms and adding a new unit
element at the top.
  
Figure 1: The Jankov Sequence
The following result can be obtained:
Theorem 1 Jankov’s logic has the UNDP.
Proof. In this proof, H,J,C denote respectively Heyting’s logic, Jankov’s logic, and
classical logic. Clearly, for any logic L, if `L ¬Ai for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (n ≥ 2) then
1Warning: in much of the literature this phrase is associated with another logic, namely that
mentioned in Section 1 with axiom ¬p ∨ ¬¬p, a formula called in Jankov [4] the Weak Law of
Excluded middle. Here and in what follows we use p, q, . . . sometimes with subscripts, as sentence
letters or propositional variables.
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`L
∨n
i=1 ¬Ai. To prove the converse in the case of L = J , suppose that 0J ¬Ai
for all i, 1 ≤ u ≤ n. Then since J ⊇ H, 0H ¬Ai for all i. By Glivenko’s Theorem,
it follows that 0C ¬Ai for all i. For each n, it can be shown that the disjunction∨n
i=1 ¬Ai (n ≥ 2) fails on the corresponding Heyting algebra Jn in the Jankov series,
by the device of taking the direct product of suitable algebras and gluing on a new
top element in order to refute a disjunction. This gives us the desired conclusion:
that 0J
∨n
i=1 ¬Ai. 
A few further remarks are in order before a corollary is noted.
(i) The direct-product-with-added-unit construction invoked at the end of the proof
was already put to elegant use by Skolem in [7], p. 199f.
(ii) Theorem 1 is implicit in McKay’s result in [6] on implicationless formulas since
in any disjunction composed of negated disjuncts, the negated disjuncts can be
transformed into intuitionistically equivalent formulas in which the connectives ∨
and → do not appear. However, McKay there makes no mention of the concepts of
the NDP and UNDP which are central to the present discussion.
(iii) The proof given for Theorem 1 shows incidentally that if X is any logic with
the n-term NDP for some n, and Y is a logic weaker than X, then Y also has
the n-term NDP, using in particular the fact that (by Glivenko) all (intermediate)
logics have the same negated formuals derivable in them. Thus suppose that X
has the n-term NDP and Y is weaker than X, with ¬A1 ∨ . . .¬An derivable in Y .
Then this disjunction is derivable in the stronger logic X and so at least one of its
disjuncts ¬Ai is derivable in X, in which case, since X and Y have the same negated
formulae derivable in them, ¬Ai is derivable in Y , showing Y to have the n-term
NDP. This is turn implies that if X has the UNDP then so does the weaker Y . This
“backwards inheritance” of the UNDP is by no means shared by the DP. Consider
Scott’s intermediate logic (see for example Anderson [1], p. 126) which extends H
by the addition of F (p) =(
(¬¬p→ p)→ (¬p ∨ p))→ (¬p ∨ ¬¬p).
It is known that this logic has the DP (originally shown by Scott, and also proved
in [1]). Let G be the formula(
(F (p)→ q)→ q) ∨ ((F (q)→ p)→ p).
G is derivable in Scott’s logic. (Indeed, G with the main ∨ replaced by ∧ is derivable
there.) Consider now the logic Φ, say, obtained by adding G to the Heyting axioms,
and the Heyting algebra L7 illustrated in Figure 2. Note first that if we assign the
sentence letter p in Scott’s axiom the value 5, the axiom takes the value ω on L7 and
is thus refutable on it. As a result, the formulae (F (p)→ q)→ q and (F (q)→ p)→ p
both of which is interdeducible with the Scott axiom, are independently refutable on
L7 by assigning the letter occurring in F (p) and F (q) respectively the value 5 and
the other letter occurring in the respective formulas the value ω. Note furthermore
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that the Scott axiom is only refutable on L7 when the propositional letter in it is
assigned the value 5. As a result (F (p) → q) → q is only refutable when p is given
the value 5 and q is given the value ω. Similarly (F (q) → p) → p is only refutable
on L7 when q is given the value 5 and p is given the value ω. But the refutation
which can be constructed by choosing the appropriate values separately in the case
of each individual disjunct in G is no longer available in the case of the disjunction
as a whole. As a consequence, G is valid on L7 whereas its disjuncts are not. Thus
Φ is an example of a logic weaker than Scott’s which, unlike it, does not have the
DP.
(iv) Similarly, the logic J does not have the DP since, for example, the disjunction(
((p→ q)→ p)→ p) ∨ (((q → p)→ q)→ q)
is valid on all the algebras of the J sequence while the Peirce formula, which may
taken as either of the two (interdeducible) disjuncts here, is not.
1
ω
2 3
4
5
0
Figure 2: L7 (for Remark (iii))
For the record, we state the following corollary of Theorem 1, brought out by
remarks (iii) and (iv):
Corollary UNDP 6⇒ DP.
One of the conspicuous features of NDP is that the number of disjuncts plays
an important role. For example in the case of the logic corresponding to the first
algebra J2 in the Jankov sequence we can show the following, in which the logic is
itself also denoted by J2.
Theorem 2 J2 has the 2-term NDP but not the 3-term NDP.
Proof. It is clear that in the case of two formulas ¬A1 and ¬A2, `J2 ¬A1 ∨¬A2 ⇔
`J2 ¬A1 or `J2 ¬A2. To show that J2 does not have the 3-term NDP consider the
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following 3-term disjunction:
¬¬(p1 → (p2 ∨ p3)) ∨ ¬¬(p2 → (p1 ∨ p3)) ∨ ¬¬(p3 → (p1 ∨ p2)).
Each disjunct taken individually is not even a classical tautology. Consider now the
whole disjunction, noting the following, in which the labels for the values are as
indicated in Figure 3:
If any one of p1, p2, p3 is assigned the value 1, the disjunction takes the value 1.
If any one of p1, p2, p3 is assigned the value 0, the disjunction takes the value 1.
If any two of the values assigned to p1, p2, p3 are the same, the disjunction takes the
value 1.
This leaves as the only remaining case the assignment of the values ω, 2, 3 to these
sentence letters (in some order). But then the disjunction again takes the value 1.
Hence the disjunction takes the value 1 under all valuations. 
1
ω
2 3
0
Figure 3: J2 again, with labels
More generally, it can be shown that each of the logics (corresponding to the
algebras) Ji has the i-term NDP but fails to have the j-term NDP for some j > i.
To see this, using the following variant of the “counting formula” introduced by
Go¨del (in [3]):
¬¬(p1 ↔ p2) ∨ ¬¬(p1 ↔ p3) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬¬(p1 ↔ pk)
∨ ¬¬(p2 ↔ p3) ∨ . . . ∨ ¬¬(p2 ↔ pk)
...
∨ ¬¬(pk−1 ↔ pk)
(∗)
Since each Ji is finite, we can always find a k to ensure the validity of (∗) on the
algebra concerned. But each individual disjunct is clearly not valid in classical logic.
(Note that each formula (∗) will eventually be refutable on some Ji in the sequence.)
This general result can no doubt be sharpened to show that for each logic (cor-
responding to the algebra) Ji has the i-term NDP but not the (i + 1)-term NDP,
i ≥ 2.
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